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Effective Public Purchasing and Market Access
2Public Procurement for Infrastructure and Economic Growth
….In the future, public procurement and related trade disciplines 
are likely to be even more important for global economic growth and 
development than they are at present. Past estimates have indicated 
that overall government procurement spending accounts for as much 
as 15–20 per cent of GDP, on average, worldwide though much of 
this is not covered by current international disciplines. Moreover, 
infrastructure investment and other public procurement in emerging 
market economies in Africa, Asia and Latin America is likely to be a 
major driving force of economic growth in years to come…
Pascal Lamy, Director – General, World Trade Organization
2011. Foreword to WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challange and Reform (edited by Sue Arrowsmith & Robert 
D. Anderson). New York, USA: Cambridge University Press
Goods, services, employees, customers, investments and intellectual property 
now cross borders at an ever-increasing rate. Governments sign regional trade 
agreements (RTAs), bilateral investment treaties, and other economic accords in 
unprecedented numbers. In the 21st century, open borders have resulted precisely 
because technological advances have combined with reforms that facilitate many 
types of commerce. 
In contrast, public procurement processes in many jurisdictions remain inward-
looking. In some cases, state purchasing regimes were designed long ago to exclude 
a foreign role. Now that globalization, and related regional economic integration, is 
the new reality, it is time to revisit whether trade liberalization can be better exploited 
to enhance procurement outcomes.
The important development priority of promoting inclusive growth is affected by public 
procurement practices. The young, the old, and the poor in particular are dependent 
upon the quality of services provided by the state and such provision relies heavily on 
where inputs are sourced from and on what terms. Companies and their employees 
The Need for More Competitive 
Procurement
3rely on state-funded infrastructure, which in turn relies on state purchasing practices. 
Whether it is poverty reduction and inclusive growth, jobs, or export promotion, the 
effectiveness of a nation’s procurement regime has in many cases a significant bearing 
on whether a state attains important social and development goals. 
There should be no taboos in reforming procurement processes. The design of state 
purchasing regimes inevitably involves balancing different socio-political interests. 
Those that have the most political clout typically tend to get their way—and this often 
makes for imperfect public policy choices. A review of public procurement processes 
in light of global and regional developments allows decision-makers to raise their 
sights above day-to-day administrative matters and consider whether the current 
balance of interests is the right one. Importantly, it encourages policy makers to assess 
if there are now better means to attain increased developmental effectiveness.
The unfortunate practical reality for government decision makers, both in developed 
and developing economies, is that vested interests seek to shape policy outcomes—to 
the detriment of the rest of society. Increased access to state contracts is no exception. 
Noble ends and means are hijacked by vested interests opposed to reform—smart 
policy makers need to keep this in mind. 
The purpose of this brochure is to highlight the broader menu of reform options for 
government policy makers—particularly those responsible for trade growth and more 
effective public procurement governance—that has arisen as the world economy has 
become more integrated and regionalized. 
4Twenty-first century globalization has gone well beyond imports crossing borders. 
However, usually engendering fears of a flood of imports overwhelming local firms 
and causing job losses—used with effect in the past to scare policy makers and to 
whip up local resistance— certain political constituencies at the national or local level 
distort opportunities and benefits that have arisen as governments and technologies 
have dissolved many impediments to cross-border commerce.
In a world where there are substantial flows of foreign direct investment—including 
investments by local subsidiaries of foreign firms—and where regional and more far-
reaching production networks and supply chains have extended their reach across 
many sectors and countries, state purchasers in many instances do not realise how 
much they already benefit from relatively open borders. Figure 1 sets out potential 
beneficial impacts to national public procurement outcomes from well-sequenced 
trade liberalization.
Figure 1: Opening borders improves public procurement outcomes
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Greater competition stimulating product and service innovations 
as well as process improvements by bidders for state contracts, 
including public suppliers
More cost-effective choices available to public buyers
More informed price benchmarking for comparable goods and 
services, deterring collusion among bidders 
Use of increased transparency facilitating ex-post reviews of 
procurement outcomes
Greater incentives to stick to norms of due process, transparency, 
and the like to ensure full compliance with trade commitments
Erosion of entitlement among well connected domestic suppliers
Greater benchmarking against international best practices in 
procurement
Trade Liberalization Can 
Improve National Procurement 
Performance
5Even for restrictive national procurement regimes, when foreign firms cannot bid for 
state contracts, foreign parts, services, and labor have often contributed to the quality 
of the items purchased or to the variety of the items from which a local buyer can 
choose. When governments ban sourcing from abroad, local subsidiaries or affiliates 
may still win state contracts.  In such cases, these firms will likely have benefited from 
managerial practices, technology, and intellectual property transferred from abroad. 
To the extent that those cross-border transfers result in better and cheaper goods and 
services, state buyers and the populations they serve gain as well. 
6Industrial Policy Preferences  
are not Inconsistent with 
Liberalized Trade and 
Procurement Regimes
Trade liberalization is much more than letting in imports. Policy makers and public 
procurement officials alike must be made aware of the potential to use trade pacts 
to upgrade the quality of governance in national procurement markets in different 
ways. If negotiated wisely, progressive trade agreements can incrementally increase 
transparency and bid contestability, deepen collaborative efforts between foreign 
and local firms, and improve accountability through more robust bid protest and dispute 
resolution mechanisms. This is an incremental process and there is typically no ‘big bang’. 
In both bilateral agreements and RTAs that address procurement issues, as well as 
in cases involving countries that have joined the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) 
Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), there is scope to retain negotiated offsets 
or local price preference schemes or set asides mandated by national industry policy 
or other overriding socio-political or economic considerations. It is simply not true 
that every option for trade reform implies abandoning national industrial policies; in 
reality, the tension between open borders and industrial policy goals is more apparent 
than real.
In particular circumstances, some RTA and GPA provisions permit for transparent 
application and, ideally, phase–out of such schemes when underlying conditions that 
originally justified such differential treatment no longer exist.  For example, many such 
trade agreements have specific provisions that protect or promote small and medium 
sized enterprises (SMEs).
These considerations highlight that a government needs to think strategically about 
how to best exploit trade liberalization in designing its public procurement regime. 
This is not to say that every state purchasing regime must be reformed in the same 
way, but rather that key design choices take account of the wider menu of options 
created by deepening trade liberalization to address procurement issues, in addition 
to focusing on first order outcomes of minimizing or eliminating tariff and similar 
financial restraints on trade.
Undeniably, many of those options intensify the competition for state contracts. 
Enhanced rivalry puts downward pressure on prices received by suppliers and some of 
7Does Strategic Market Access Maximize Economic Growth?
The merits of industrial policy and its role in economic development, 
in both developed and developing countries, has been the subject of 
considerable discussion and debate.  See, for example, Ha-Jong Chang, 
Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective 
(2002) or, more recently, Ian Fletcher, Free Trade Doesn’t Work: What 
Should Replace it and Why (2011). Whatever position is taken in this 
debate, use of preferential public procurement schemes to assist in 
promotion of industrial policy objectives has to date received little, if 
any, separate discussion. However, in an era of slower economic growth 
and increasing fiscal constraint, particularly in Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, focus on the 
potential advantage (or disadvantage) of using public procurement 
regimes to reinforce other government policy measures promoting 
national industrial policy and employment objectives seems increasingly 
likely. In all events, more considered assessment of preferential domestic 
procurement regimes will sharpen focus on potential economic costs and 
benefits, and shorter and longer-term tradeoffs, as well as whether, and 
the extent to which, such regimes promote or are meaningfully associated 
with sustained dynamic comparative advantage and trade creation. 
them may lose state contracts. This is one of those situations where it is critical to weigh 
all of the consequences of a policy change. The intensified rivalry also forces all firms—
domestic and foreign—to keep cutting costs, raising productivity, and improving their 
service offerings, all of which benefits state buyers and the many in society who depend 
upon state-provided services. Policy makers must consider the impact on every relevant 
social interest, not just on those vested interests with political clout that invariably 
bemoan the ‘creative destruction’ brought about by progressive change.
It is important to realize that the medium term effect of greater competition is often 
quite different from its immediate consequences. As domestic firms raise their game, 
the more efficient and responsive are better able to withstand foreign competition 
and, ultimately, to contest meaningfully in foreign markets. At the same time, less 
competitive firms may be driven out of particular markets. To be sure,  governments 
can secure many of the benefits of open borders—greater choice, better value for 
money, access to foreign managerial practices and technology—through focusing 
directly on the need for national reforms undertaken on their own, often making 
reference to best practices. 
8Some have taken the above approach in bringing about such reforms, most often 
relying on a narrow band of NGOs and civil society and social groups interested 
in transparency and accountability, without the benefit of a broader commercial 
community of interest. Others, however, have given greater traction to such initiatives 
by garnering support from local exporters and commercial interests that benefit by 
regional production networks or local supply chain integration through introducing 
progressive provisions relating to improvements in public procurement regimes as 
part of trade agreements. 
9RTAs are binding agreements between members that are not global in scope. This 
means a RTA could involve two or more signatories from different continents. WTO 
reports that there has been a wave of such accords since 1995, so the question of 
how RTAs can be used to shape government procurement reforms is a live one. This 
question is particularly relevant for the Asia and Pacific region where, since 1990, over 
200 RTAs have been signed or are under negotiation.
One significant misconception of non-trade experts is that RTAs only refer to getting 
rid of tariffs and quotas on manufactured goods. In fact, given the right opportunities, 
trade negotiators have also sought to include rules that enhance the transparency 
and operational integrity of markets and of the regulatory regimes that oversee them. 
As government spending has grown over time, trade negotiators have sought ways 
to attain those objectives in state purchasing regimes as well. The result is a rich set 
of alternative reform options.
Using Regional Trade Agreements 
to Enhance National Procurement 
Governance
10
Trade agreements provide two main ways in which governments can exploit open 
borders when redesigning their state purchasing regimes. First, trade agreements can 
be used to introduce and strengthen important procedural rights, due process, and 
transparency into public procurement practices. Institutional innovations—such as 
improvements to bid challenge procedures and wider dissemination of procurement 
opportunities and procedures—have been parts of reform packages that have been 
codified in trade agreements. Smart governments have used the negotiation of RTAs 
to upgrade a wide range of regulatory institutions. 
Second, trade agreements create an important dynamic: they facilitate the alignment of 
national reform-minded constituents with progressive outward-oriented local firms as well 
as regional or international concerns interested in deepening production networks and 
supply chain integration. Such accords combine a range of obligations into one bundle, 
to the immediate advantage of national firms that want to export and invest more abroad. 
Those firms have a strong incentive to ensure that their government follows through on 
implementing reforms that were promised to trading partners, lest those partners too 
renege on their commitments to the disadvantage of such outward-oriented firms. For a 
reforming policy maker, these firms are allies that counterbalance the objections of those 
local firms—not infrequently owned or sponsored by vested interests—that oppose pro-
curement reform. If well managed, the basis of support for procurement reform in the 
RTA context can be broader and more sustained than under unilateral reforms.
Another advantage of RTAs is that they can incorporate different levels of reforming 
ambition as detailed in Figure 2 below. A recent analysis of RTAs in the Asia and 
Pacific region showed that, in fact, five levels of ambition—ranging from reinforcing 
and codifying the status quo to the creation of a single market for government 
procurement contracts in goods and services—have been negotiated. This reinforces 
Reinforce
Status
Quo
Apply best
efforts
to reform
Commit to 
negotiate
reform in 
future
Agree to 
partial 
elimination 
of barriers 
to foreign 
bidders
Single  
Procurement 
Market
Figure 2: Five degrees of reforming ambition on procurement matters in RTAs
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the point that reforming state purchasing through trade agreements is not simply 
a theoretical option but is, in fact, a practical alternative flexibly pursued by many 
governments to deepen regional (and global) economic integration. Moreover, there 
is no single, rigid template for trade agreement-based procurement reform, so policy 
makers can tailor initiatives to their own needs and circumstances.
The Multilateral Option:  WTO’s GPA
Another option for national policy makers is to join the WTO’s GPA. This accord is unlike 
many others at the WTO. Apart from a few countries that joined this organization since 
1995, membership is voluntary. In December 2011, revisions to the GPA were agreed. 
These revisions include provisions of specific interest to developing countries, namely, 
allowing retention of price preferences and offsets, higher thresholds before multilateral 
obligations begin, exceptions to public bodies covered, and longer phase-in times. Provision 
exists to extend those phase-in times further and, in general, least developed countries 
are given greater latitude than other developing countries. As many Asia and Pacific 
countries designate themselves as developing countries at the WTO, these provisions are 
of considerable potential interest for those governments considering acceding to the GPA. 
Members of the GPA have negotiated to open up parts of their state procurement 
markets to each other’s firms. The exact amount of opening is negotiated by 
parties, indicating that there is flexibility to respond to domestic factors. As Table 1 
(see page 12) shows, the total size of state spending by GPA signatories from developed 
countries on goods already exported by Asian developing countries was nearly 
$700 billion in 2008. While construction, computer, and telecommunications services 
account for the bulk of that sum, these are sectors where Asian firms will continue to 
have strong competitive advantages and opportunity for deepened regional and wider 
trade growth with increased GPA membership in the future. 
A recent study of the effect of GPA membership on trade between OECD countries 
(using econometric modeling) found that, for most signatories, the GPA has a positive 
impact on bilateral trade in goods and services, though the magnitude of impact may 
vary between trade in goods and services.1 This study noted that GPA membership 
seems to play a more important role in promoting bilateral trade in services than in 
trade for goods, possibly because, for the countries surveyed, services accounted for 
a majority of the government procurement market for most GPA parties. The results 
also suggested that exports were influenced considerably more by GPA membership 
than imports. The GPA, then, can be seen as a positive factor for trade creation and 
expansion of export markets for OECD countries, particularly in the context of services.
1 H. Chen and J. Whalley. 2011. The WTO Government Procurement Agreement and Its Impacts 
on Trade. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series, Working Paper 17365. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research.
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GPA membership, however, involves more than exchange access to national 
procurement markets. While GPA signatories take on a range of procedural and 
institutional obligations, those obligations specify outcomes and objectives and not 
form—allowing for different approaches to state purchasing to coexist. The goal is to 
encourage the transparent, honest, and unbiased implementation of state purchasing 
that respects the due process rights of other signatories and their exporters. Unlike 
other WTO accords, the GPA is unique in giving foreign suppliers rights to challenge 
government decisions, in this case bid processes. When run properly, these challenge 
procedures build confidence in the integrity of public procurement processes, reducing 
the likelihood that public procurement disputes spiral out of control.
Table 1: GPA member spending on goods exported from  
Asia and Pacific countries
 
Specific Sectors
European Union 
(2007)
(for all covered  
government 
entities,  
∈= $1.3706)
Japan (2008)
(except otherwise 
specified for central 
government entities 
only)
United States 
(2008)  
(except otherwise 
specified, for the 
US Department  
of Defense  
[DOD] only) Total
Construction Services $125.7 billion $11 billion  
(central and subcentral 
government entities 
only)
$287 billion  
(central government 
entities only)
$423.7 billion
Pharmaceutical 
Products, Health 
Services and Related 
Entities
$15.1 billion $1.46 billion $120 billion $136.56 billion
Computer and 
Related Services
$46.5 billion $US 2.1 billion
$1.6 billion $54.83 billion
Telecommunication 
Services
$4.1 billion $531 million
Chemical Products $21 billion $7.2 million $2.24 billion $23.25 billion
Fuels and Petroleum 
Products
$4.5 billion – $12.3 billion $16.8 billion
Machinery and 
Associated Products
$14 billion $329 million $518 million $14.85 billion
Textile, Cothing and 
Footwear
$4.4 billion $19 million – $4.42 billion
Plastic and Rubber 
Products
$903 million $3 million $53 million $959 million
Wood Product $195 million $62 million – $257 million
Total $236.4 billion $15.51 billion $423.71 billion $675.63 billion
Source: Robert Anderson et al. 2011. Assessing the Value of Future Accessions to the WTO Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA). World Trade Organization Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-15. Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Trade Organization.
Parties
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In a world of open borders, GPA influence extends beyond the formal accord. 
Commentators have noted that many RTAs include obligations taken from the GPA. 
Many GPA principles are also aligned with leading United Nations instruments on 
public procurement, such as United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL). Concerns, then, about a tangled web of international obligations—such 
as overlapping rules of origin in the context of tariffs—appear less problematic in the 
area of public procurement than they are in other policies covered by trade agreements. 
On joining WTO, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) committed to join the GPA. In 
December 2007, PRC sought to honor that commitment by formally seeking accession. 
PRC involvement in the GPA accession process has been associated with an increase 
in the number of formal GPA “observers” from Asia which now include Indonesia, 
India and Thailand. No doubt the latter are interested to learn on what terms PRC 
will join and the negotiation processes associated with that accession. Unlike most 
WTO accords, the most favored nation principle does not apply to government 
procurement, so PRC might negotiate access to foreign government procurement 
markets on a reciprocal basis. Whether other Asian nations can negotiate similar 
terms remains to be seen. 
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Ten Myths associated with Open Borders and Public Procurement
1) Our domestic firms have done a good job supplying the government in the 
past. We don’t need open borders in public procurement. No: If existing 
government suppliers source parts and raw materials from abroad they’re 
already benefiting from open borders. The same is true if they’ve hired 
foreign workers. Moreover, if any suppliers are local subsidiaries of foreign 
firms, then state buyers are already benefiting from open borders.
2) Favoring local firms through set asides and the like isn’t allowed under 
modern trade accords. No: RTAs and the WTO’s GPA allow for both 
permanent and temporary sectoral exceptions to liberalization. 
3) Industrial policy is impossible after trade agreements come into force. 
No: Trade agreements haven’t prevented a massive revival of interest in 
industrial policy since the global economic crisis started in 2007. Not every 
industrial policy tool discriminates against foreign commercial interests 
and those that do can be covered by carve-outs and exceptions in trade 
agreements.
4) Opening up procurement markets to foreign firms will reduce the share of 
public contracts filled by domestic firms. No: When the Republic of Korea 
joined the WTO’s GPA, for example, the share of contracts won by foreign 
firms went down, not up. 
5) Opening up state contracts to foreign bidders will put government buyers 
at the mercy of international cartels and multinational companies. No: 
While anti-competitive foreign corporate practices certainly exist, there is 
a growing body of evidence in developing and industrialized countries 
showing how state buyers are taken advantage of by collusion between 
domestic suppliers. Policy makers should have no illusions here. Whatever 
their source, anti-competitive practices are a serious challenge facing state 
purchasers and the proper laws and regulations should be put in place to 
tackle them. 
15
6) Developing countries need time to build up institutions and competi-
tiveness before opening their procurement markets to trade. Yes and 
No (depends on circumstances): Technical assistance provided in 
conjunction with a trade agreement can be used to build up domestic 
capacity before imports are allowed to contest local markets on more 
favorable terms. Trade agreements are flexible enough to allow sequenc-
ing of reform.
7) Developing countries don’t have the political will to sign free trade 
agreements that include meaningful public procurement provisions. 
No: Not every free trade agreement has expansive obligations on state 
purchasing. Real world experience has shown there are five different 
approaches to dealing with procurement matters in trade agreements, 
starting from affirming the status quo to high levels of reforming ambition. 
8) Our exporters could never win foreign government procurement 
contracts. No: When presented with lucrative commercial opportunities, 
within an encouraging policy framework, properly incentivized managers 
rise to the challenge. Many developing country exporters of commodities, 
raw materials, and parts and components benefit indirectly when their 
corporate buyers win contracts to supply foreign governments. Direct 
exports to foreign governments are only part of the picture in a world of 
integrated supply chains.
9) WTO trade rounds take forever. No: As a useful vehicle to frame a reform 
program, the WTO’s GPA operates independently of multi-year WTO trade 
rounds. Moreover, it’s possible to negotiate RTAs independently of the 
WTO timetable. Not every negotiation has to be a marathon, like the 
Doha Round.
10) Trade diplomats know nothing about public procurement. No: Many 
trade diplomats have learned about public procurement matters. Many 
trade ministries consult widely within government before developing 
negotiating positions. This is a matter of internal coordination and 
organization within a government.
16
continued on next page
Public buyers of goods, services, and infrastructure should check whether the 
institutions are in place to take the greatest advantage of trade integration. This applies 
to every state purchaser—not just national governments. Regional and wider economic 
integration represents a clear way to push suppliers to compete, upgrade their offerings 
and after-sales service, as well as the often overlooked related opportunity to enhance 
the transparency, predictability, and integrity of public procurement processes.
It is equally clear that forward-looking officials prepared to better take advantage of 
open borders will face opposition from those who have benefited from the status 
quo. Opponents to reform will resort to a lot of misleading and false claims—see 
the “Ten Myths” (at pages 14–15). Reformers should reject sectional interests and 
pursue the broader national interest instead. In a time of strained public finances, 
policy makers should be getting the best possible value for money while promoting 
transparency, economy, efficiency, equal opportunity and fairness.
Options for Policy Makers
National Policy Coherence is Critical
...In public procurement markets the official de jure discrimination in the 
shape of declared preferences for national suppliers or price preferences 
generally represents only the tip of the iceberg of informal de facto 
discrimination that is made possible thanks to the scope for discretion 
in interpreting contact award procedures. The fact that some countries 
make use of de jure ‘buy national’ policies does not change this fact.  Past 
experience with efforts to achieve transparency and competition in public 
procurement suggests that this can only really be achieved when key 
interests in government, industry and purchasing entities are persuaded 
that this is the best policy....international agreements are unlikely to 
provide early solutions to problems created by national champion policies 
pursued by other countries based on preferential public procurement...
European Union. 2012. Public Procurement in International Trade. Belgium  
(This study was prepared by Dr. Stephen Woolcock for the European  
Parliament’s Committee on International Trade). 
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Governments of all types have started down the reform path and have found trade 
agreements a useful vehicle to shape in some cases—and to reinforce in others 
improvements in national public procurement systems. Reforms can be tailored to 
local circumstances—the record shows there is “no one size fits all” approach.
Equally important, meaningful procurement reform is, more often than not, difficult 
given the resistance of vested interests to increased  transparency and competition. 
Therefore, in practical terms, approaches to addressing improved market access 
through trade agreements need to be incremental in nature, through a gradual yet 
determined effort by progressive trade negotiators, public procurement agencies 
and reform-minded constituencies, and carefully sequenced to promote sustained 
momentum. 
A rethink of how the ultimate beneficiaries of better state purchasing practices—
namely, taxpayers, users of state services (many of whom are poor), and firms that 
rely on state infrastructure and services—can best benefit from open borders is long 
overdue. Deeper trade integration can contribute to inclusive growth, enhanced 
resource allocation and productivity levels, as well as improved governments.
Possible Next Steps
Governments in the Asia and Pacific region can take the following eight steps to 
secure the benefits of increased regional and wider economic integration:
•	 Investigate and identify factors that discourage firms from bidding for public 
contracts in their jurisdictions;
•	 Review existing rationales for national public purchasing rules, analyzing 
alternative policy approaches (and related trade-offs and externalities) with 
greater or lesser degrees of market access; 
•	 Assess the costs and benefits of existing biases for selected firms against 
potentially greater opportunities for national exporters and foreign firms, 
subsidiaries and importers; 
•	 Explore ways in which approaches to public procurement in RTAs can usefully 
promote national development, trade and growth strategies, with particular 
attention on: 
 – exploiting opportunities to upgrade national procurement institutions and 
practices; and 
 – deepening supply chain and production network integration (through, 
for example, targeted technical assistance and capacity development 
collaboration with RTA partners)
•	 Assess short and longer term market impacts and incremental sequencing of 
trade and procurement reforms to optimize national policy choices;
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•	 Benchmark national public procurement performance against good practice 
norms contained in UNCITRAL and other regional and international accords;
•	 Consider gaining “observer status” for WTO’s GPA with a view to learn the pros 
and cons of joining the GPA and the experience of other GPA signatories; and
•	 Deepen the impact of existing and contemplated RTAs through inclusion of new 
provisions, or making existing commitments relating to public procurement 
markets stronger.
Development partners can  assist governments in such efforts, including through 
promoting initiatives that focus on quantifying the costs of local “rent seeking” 
behavior and the potential savings from more robust competition because of 
increased transparency and market access resulting from trade agreements that 
include progressive procurement-related provisions.
With significant increases in “South–South” trade over the past 2 decades, and the 
need to promote global rebalancing in the aftermath of the economic contraction of 
2008, national policy coherence in the area of industrial policy, public procurement 
governance and trade liberalization is long overdue.
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